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Abstract
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid
Coalitions (PSC). We characterize committees satisfying PSC as possible out-
comes of the Minimal Demand rule, which generalizes an approach pioneered
by Michael Dummett.
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1. Introduction
In multimember elections, a central concern is proportional representation
of voters. When voters elicit ranked preferences over candidates, one particu-
lar axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions
(PSC). This axiom was advocated by Dummett [4] and has been referred to as
the most important requirement for proportional representation [15, 16, 18, 19].
PSC is the subject of many theoretical and empirical studies. Theoretical
studies have focused on designing voting rules that satisfy PSC; these include
single transferable vote (STV) [15], Quota Borda System (QBS) [4], Schulz-
STV [14], and the Expanding Approvals Rule (EAR) [2]. STV is the most
prominent of these rules2 and has attracted significant attention in the literature
from both a theoretical [7, 10, 12, 17] and empirical perspective [5, 9]. However,
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few studies consider the structure imposed by the PSC axiom.3
In this note, we present a characterization of PSC committees as the range
of outcomes from a certain procedure; we formalize and call this rule the Min-
imal Demand (MD) rule. MD generalizes an approach pioneered by Michael
Dummett. We also present an alternative way of viewing MD in terms of a
“Dummett Tree,” which represents a decision tree with decisions taken at each
branching of a node. Our main result is the following: A committee satisfies
PSC if and only it is a possible outcome of MD if and only if it is an outcome
of a branch of a Dummett tree.
This contribution is important because it provides an intuitive and tractable
method for researchers to analyze the demands of PSC on committee outcomes.
We hope that this characterization will be useful for understanding the interac-
tion between PSC and other axioms.
2. Preliminaries
We consider the standard social choice setting with a set of voters N =
{1, . . . , n}, a set of candidates C = {c1, . . . , cm} and a preference profile ≻=
(≻1, . . . ,≻n) such that each ≻i is linear order over C. If cs ≻i ct then we say
that voter i prefers candidate cs to candidate ct or, equivalently, voter i ranks
candidate cs ahead of candidate ct. Based on the preference profile, the goal is
to select a committee W ⊂ C of pre-determined size k.
The focus of this paper is on committees that satisfy the Proportionality of
Solid Coalitions (PSC) axiom. Before formally defining PSC, we introduce the
notion of a solid coalition which is central to the PSC axiom. Intuitively, a set
of voters N ′ forms a solid coalition for a set of candidates C′ if every voter in
N ′ prefers every candidate in C′ to any candidate outside of C′. Importantly,
voters that form a solid coalition for a candidate-set C′ are not required to have
identical preference orderings over candidates within C′ nor C\C′.
Definition 1 (Solid coalition). A set of voters N ′ is a solid coalition for a set
of candidates C′ if every voter in N ′ ranks (strictly prefers) every candidates
in C′ ahead of every candidate in C\C′. That is, for all i ∈ N ′ and for any
c′ ∈ C′
∀c ∈ C\C′ c′ ≻i c.
The candidates in C′ are said to be supported by the voter set N ′, and, con-
versely, the voter set N ′ is said to be supporting the candidate set C′.
We now state the PSC definition. Informally, PSC requires that a com-
mittee W “adequately” represents the preferences of solid coalitions that are
“sufficiently large” by including some candidates that they support in relation
3A notable exception includes [11]. In a setting where voters are assumed to have dichoto-
mous preferences, Peters’ (2018) results imply that an analogous PSC axiom is incompatible
with strategyproofness. Note that in this setting the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [8, 13]
does not apply.
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to the size of the solid coalition. Here “adequately” and “sufficiently large” are
defined according to a parameter q ∈ (n/(k+1), n/k] and leads to a hierarchy of
PSC definitions denoted by q-PSC. In slightly more detail, a committee satisfies
q-PSC if, for every positive integer ℓ, every solid coalition of voters N ′ for a
candidate-set C′ with size |N ′| ≥ ℓq has: at least ℓ candidates included in W
from the candidate-set C′ or, if C′ is smaller than ℓ, has all candidates in C′
included in W .
Definition 2 (q-PSC). Let q ∈ (n/(k+1), n/k]. We say a committeeW satisfies
q-PSC if for every positive integer ℓ, and for every solid coalition N ′ supporting
a candidate subset C′ with size |N ′| ≥ ℓq, the following holds
|W ∩ C′| ≥ min{ℓ, |C′|}.
The q-PSC axiom captures intuitive features of proportional representation.
The axiom ensures representation of minority voters so long as they share simi-
lar preferences over candidates, i.e., they form a solid coalition, and the amount
of representation given to a group of voters that form a solid coalition is (ap-
proximately) in proportion to their size.
Note that the q-PSC axiom forms a hierarchy of axioms: if, for some q, an
outcome W satisfies q-PSC, then W satisfies q′-PSC for all q′ > q [2, Lemma
2].
The q-PSC definition assumes that q ∈ (n/(k+1), n/k].4 If q = n/k, then the
q-PSC property is referred to as Hare-PSC. If q = n/(k+1)+ ǫ, for sufficiently
small ǫ > 0 , then the q-PSC property is referred to as Droop-PSC.56 We
denote the Hare quota value, n/k, by qH . Abusing notation slightly, we denote
any quota value n/k + ǫ with ǫ > 0 satisfying (1) by qD and refer to it as the
Droop quota.7
Remark 1. There are some reasons to prefer the Droop quota. First, for k = 1
the Droop quota satisfies the majority principle [19]: A candidate that is most
preferred by more than half of the voters is selected whenever such a candidate
4See [2, Footnote 10] for justification.
5Droop PSC is also referred to as Droop’s proportionality criterion (DPC). Technically
speaking the Droop quota is ⌊n/(k + 1)⌋ + 1. The exact value n/(k + 1) is referred to as the
Hagenbach-Bischoff quota.
6Formally, ǫ is required to be positive and small enough so that that for any ℓ ≤ k,
⌈ℓ · q⌉ ≤ ℓ
n
k + 1
+ 1, (1)
where q = n/(k + 1) + ǫ. The inequality (1) ensures that if there exists a solid coalition N ′
of size |N ′| > ℓ n
k+1
supporting a candidate set C′, then any q-PSC committee contains at
least ℓ candidates from C′. To see this, note that if |N ′| > ℓ n
k+1
, then |N ′| > ⌈ℓq⌉ − 1 and
so |N ′| ≥ ⌈ℓq⌉ ≥ ℓq since |N ′| is integer valued. The requirement that ǫ is positive guarantees
that a q-PSC committee always exists.
7For fixed n and k, any pair of Droop quotas q1, q2 are equivalent in terms of the q-PSC
requirement. To see this, note that if |N ′| ≥ ℓq2 then |N ′| > ℓ · n/(k + 1) but then by (1) it
must be that |N ′| ≥ ℓq1.
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exists.8 Second, Droop-PSC implies Hare-PSC, which was stated as an essential
property that a rule designed for PR should satisfy [4].
3. Minimal Demand Rule and the Dummett Tree
Dummett proposed the Quota Borda System (QBS) rule as follows. It ex-
amines the prefixes (of increasing sizes) of the preference lists of voters and
checking whether there exists a corresponding solid coalition for a set of voters.
If there is such a solid set of voters, then an appropriate number of candidates
with the highest Borda count are selected so as to satisfy the corresponding
PSC demand.
We view this approach as a more general class of rules that we refer to as
the Minimal Demand (MD) rule. Just like in QBS, we examine prefixes (of
increasing sizes) of the preference lists of voters and check whether there exists a
corresponding solid coalition for a set of voters. If there is such a solid set of vot-
ers, then a minimal subset of candidates is selected to satisfy the corresponding
PSC requirement.9 The MD algorithm is formalized as Algorithm 1.
Since MD specifies a candidate subset from which a candidate should be
selected, rather than specifying a single candidate, there is a great deal of flex-
ibility in how these “ties” are resolved, i.e., which candidate from the subset is
selected. By considering different tie-breaking decisions, we can attain different
outcomes of MD. These outcomes can be represented in the form of a decision
tree, which we will refer to as the Dummett Tree.
The Dummett tree can be viewed as a (possibly) non-deterministic tree
corresponding to how the MD rule can be run depending on the selection of
candidates in each stage. Each node along a path of Dummett tree corresponds
to a stage. The Dummett tree has depth m. If k candidates have already
been selected by stage j, we still go over all the stages. At each stage i of the
tree the rule only considers prefixes of voter preferences lists up to their i-th
most preferred candidate. Accordingly, only those PSC demands that pertain
to the most preferred i candidates of each voter are considered. Each path of
the tree reflects the selection of candidates. Each node in the path represents
the selection of candidates at that point keeping in view the candidates already
selected at nodes higher up in the path.10 For a preference profile ≻, we will
denote the corresponding Dummett tree by DT(≻).
Note that each preference profile gives rise to PSC demands. We can parti-
tion the PSC demands among demands pertaining to rank from j = 1 to m. For
8A related property for general k is the fixed majority principle [3]. However, for k > 1,
the fixed majority principle is incomparable with PSC and is not aligned with proportional
representation. For discussion on other properties in multiwinner voting that are related to
majority comparisons, we refer readers to [1, 6].
9In our formalization of the rule candidates from the candidate subset are selected in a
sequential manner.
10Equivalently, one may also include “null” nodes, which represent stages where no candi-
date was selected, in the tree.
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Algorithm 1 MD
Input: (N,C,%, k) parametrised by quota q ∈ ( n
k+1 ,
n
k
].
Output: W ⊆ C such that |W | = k
1: Default quota q as n/(k + 1)
2: W ←− ∅
3: j ←− 1 {j is referred to as the stage of the algorithm.}
4: while j < m do
5: while there does not exist a solidly supported set of candidates in Cj
whose demand is not met by W do
6: j ←− j + 1 {This can viewed as no selection being made at the stage
because no selection was required.}
7: end while
8: Partition the set of voters into equivalence classes where each class has
the same solidly supported set of j candidates. {The next while loop in
called the selection while loop in which the selection of candidates in a
stage occurs.}
9: while there exists an equivalence class of voters N ′ ⊆ N whose PSC
demand with respect to first j candidates is not met by W do
10: Take any candidate c /∈W that is solidly supported in the first j posi-
tions by N ′
11: W ←−W ∪ {c}
12: end while
13: end while
14: return W
any given j, we only consider candidates in C(j): the set of candidates involved
in preferences of voters up to their first j positions.
A reformulation of the MD rule. Consider the following voting rule, which we
call w-MD.
For each voter i ∈ N initialize wi = 1, initialize W ′ = ∅ and j = 1.
Consider every voters top j-preferred candidates (denote the union of
all voters top j-preferences by C(j)), if there exists a set of candidates
C′ ⊆ C(j) supported by a solid coalition of voters N ′ with weight
T :=
∑
i∈N ′
wi ≥ q, (2)
and there exists a positive integer ℓ such that
|N ′| ≥ ℓq and |C′ ∩W ′| < ℓ, (3)
then select an unelected candidate c′ from C′ and update W ′ to
W ′ ∪ {c′}, and rescale the weight of all voters in N ′ to wi ×
T−q
T
.
Repeat until no such set of candidates C′ exists, or all candidates in
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any such set have already been elected. If j < m, update j to j +1;
otherwise terminate the algorithm.
Some observations:
(i) The selection of different candidates, and the different choices of solid
coalitions leads to different outcomes. Thus, the set of all possible out-
comes (represented by the tree) forms an irresolute voting rule.
(ii) The only difference between MD and w-MD is the re-weighting and con-
dition (2), but note that condition (3) implies condition (2).
(iii) At the start of the algorithm, the total weight of all voters is |N | = n. At
the election of a new candidate this (total weight) decreases by precisely
q. Furthermore, since
n− ℓq ≥ q for all ℓ 6= k, and n− kq < q,
and the entire set of voters N is a solid coalition for C the voting rule
is guaranteed to have elected precisely k candidates by the end of the
j = m-th stage.
Lemma 1. MD and w-MD are equivalent. That is, an outcome is attainable
under MD if and only if it is attainable under w-MD.
Proof. Fix the preferences of voters, and let W = {c1, . . . , ck} be some outcome
from MD such that candidate cs is elected before candidate ct for all 1 ≤ s <
t ≤ k.
Now suppose that there is no outcome of w-MD that coincides with W . Let
W ′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
k} be an outcome of w-MD, and denote by p the first index
such that cp 6= c′p and cs = c
′
s for all s < p. Note that p is the index of the
‘point-of-first-difference’ between the election outcomes W and W ′. Further-
more, suppose that among all w-MD outcomes W ′ maximizes this ‘point-of-
first-differences’ index p.
Suppose that cp is elected in MD at the j-th stage (i.e., when considering
the set of C(j) candidates). Consider the stage where the C(j) candidates are
considered under w-MD. Since cp is required for PSC (due to minimal demand
election procedure of MD), it must be that cp is an element of a candidate C
′
which is solidly supported by a group of voters |N ′| ≥ ℓq for some ℓ, and
|{c1, . . . , cp−1} ∩ C
′| < ℓ. (4)
Now consider the w-MD voting rule, the group of voters N ′ clearly satisfies the
second condition (3). Thus, it only remains to prove that (2) also holds. The
original total weight of voters in N ′ was T0 ≥ ℓq (since we intialize wi = 1).
Given that (4) holds, and the group of voters only solidly support candidates
in C′, it must be that the remaining weight is at least T0 − (ℓ − 1)q ≥ q. We
conclude that (2) holds. Thus, cp is a valid choice for w-MD and at least one
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of the outcomes of w-MD must include {c1, . . . , cp} which has ‘point-of-first-
difference’ index of at least p + 1. This contradicts the maximality of W ′; we
conclude that W is attainable under w-MD.
Now, conversely, let W ′ = {c′1, . . . , c
′
k} be some outcome from w-MD such
that candidate c′s is elected before candidate c
′
t for all 1 ≤ s < t ≤ k.
Suppose that there is no outcome of MD that coincides with W ′. Let W =
{c1, . . . , ck} be an outcome of MD, and again denote by p the index such that
cp 6= c′p and cs = c
′
s for all s < p. Furthermore, suppose that among all MD
outcomes W maximizes this ‘point-of-first-differences’ index p.
Suppose that cp is elected in w-MD at the j-th stage (i.e., when considering
the set of C(j) candidates). Consider the stage where the C(j) candidates are
considered under MD. Since cp was elected under w-MD it must be the case
that there exists a group of voters N ′ who solidly supporting a candidate subset
C′ with cp ∈ C′ such that the weight of N ′ is T ≥ q. That is, both (2) and (3)
hold. But the MD voting rule only requires (3) to hold to make cp a valid choice.
This leads to a new outcome which has a strictly larger ‘point-of-first-difference’
index of p+ 1. This is a contradiction and so it must be that W ′ is attainable
under MD.
4. MD, Dummett Trees and PSC
We present some connections between MD, Dummett Trees and PSC.
Lemma 2 states that each possible outcome of MD satisfies PSC. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the first formal argument that MD returns a PSC commit-
tee and the outcome being PSC does not depend on the specific choices made
during the algorithm.
Lemma 2. Each path along the Dummett Tree gives rise to a selection of a
committee satisfying PSC. Equivalently, each possible outcome of MD satisfies
PSC.
Proof. Equivalently, we consider the w-MD formulation of MD (recall
Lemma 1).
We denote by C(j) the set of candidate involved in the j-preferential election,
and fix q ∈ ( n
k+1 ,
n
k
].
Let W be an arbitrary outcome from the w-MD voting rule. For sake of
a contradiction suppose that W does not satisfy PSC; that is, there exists a
positive integer ℓ and a group of voters N ′ with |N ′| ≥ ℓq solidly supporting a
candidate subset C′ such that
|W ∩ C′| < min{ℓ, |C′|}.
Assume that ℓ and C′ are minimal such that
|W ∩ C′| = ℓ− 1.
This can always be achieved by considering smaller subsets of N ′ and smaller
values ℓ′ < ℓ.
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Now consider j-preferential election for j = |C′|. Note that C′ ⊆ C(j),
hence voters in N ′ only vote for candidates in C′ in this election, and also all
previous j′-preferential elections for j′ < j, Now, let Wj ⊆W denote the subset
of elected candidates at the termination of this j-preferential election. Since
|W ∩C′| = ℓ−1 < ℓ, it follows that |Wj ∩C
′| ≤ ℓ−1 and so condition (3) in the
w-MD rule is satisfied. Furthermore, it must be the case that the total weight
of voters in N ′ exceeds q; that is, condition (2) is also satisfied. This follows
since the group N ′ starts with weight T0 = |N ′| ≥ ℓq and the election of each
candidate (< ℓ such candidates) reduces this weight by at most q (strictly less
when there is overlap of coalitions), and so
T ≥ T0 − |Wj ∩ C
′|q ≥ (ℓ− |Wj ∩ C
′|)q ≥ q.
The w-MD voting rule cannot terminate without either an additional ℓ−|Wj∩C′|
candidates from C′ being elected, or the total weight of voters in N ′ being
reduced below q. Voters in N ′ can only have their weight reduced below q in
this j-preferential election if an additional ℓ − |Wj ∩ C′| candidates in C′ are
elected, and so the former is required before the voting rule can proceed to
the (j + 1)-preferential election. But, by assumption, these candidates were
not elected, and so it must be that the (j + 1) preferential election is never
attained and so |Wj | = k. That is, the additional candidates were not elected
because it would exceed the size limit of the election outcome W . However,
this cannot be the case. For if it were, then the total weight of all voters at the
termination of the j-preferential election would be < q (note that n− (kq) < q),
which contradicts the existence of the set of N ′ voters with weight ≥ q at the
termination of this j-preferential election.
Notice that Lemma 2 implies the following. Any voting rule that proceeds
by sequentially electing candidates is guaranteed to satisfy PSC so long as: (1)
candidates are only added if they resolve a PSC violation, and (2) candidates
that resolve violation of PSC for smaller prefixes of voters preferences are elected
before candidates that resolve violations for larger prefixes.
Lemma 3 provides a converse to Lemma 2: every PSC committee is a possible
outcome of MD.
Lemma 3. Take any committee W satisfying PSC. Then the candidates in W
are selected along some path of the Dummett tree.
Proof. Consider a committee W satisfying PSC. We simulate MD that makes
makes decisions along the tree and selects candidates from W . The proof is by
induction on the number of stages. At each stage, we can select candidates only
from W to fulfill the PSC demands for the first j positions. Since W satisfies
PSC and hence all PSC demands, if we have selected Wj ⊂ W by the j-th
stage, there exists a set Wj+1 such that Wj ⊆Wj+1 ⊆W that satisfies the PSC
demands up to the first j+1 positions. Hence there always exists a path in the
Dummett tree that selects W .
Combining the two lemmas gives us the following equivalence theorem.
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Theorem 1. The following four statements are equivalent.
(i) A committee satisfies PSC.
(ii) A committee is an outcome of some path of the Dummett tree.
(iii) A committee is a possible outcome of MD.
(iv) A committee is a possible outcome of w-MD.
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